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BUILDING UP SOCIAL CAPITAL IN A CHANGING WORLD 
 








This paper models the dynamic process through which a large society may 
succeed in building up its “social capital” by establishing a stable and dense pattern of 
interaction among its members. In the model, agents interact according to a collection 
of (idyosincratic) infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma played on the existing social 
network. This network not only specifies the playing partners but, crucially, also 
determines how relevant strategic information diffuses or new cooperation opportunities 
are found. Over time, the underlying payoffs randomly change, i.e. display some 
“volatility”. In response to it, agents react by creating new links and removing others. 
This combines into a complex but ergodic dynamic process, whose analysis is 
undertaken in different ways. First, we rely on its ergodicity to “compute” numerically 
its long-run regularities. Second, we use mean-field approximations to derive analytical 
results. Both routes are found in accord and also complementary. 
  
The long-run dynamics of the process sharply depends on environmental 
volatility, displaying the following features: (a) Only if volatility is not too high can the 
society sustain a dense social network and thus attain a large average payoff. (b) The 
social architecture endogenously responds to increased volatility by becoming more 
cohesive. (c) Network-based strategic effects are an essential buffer that preclude the 
abrupt collapse of the social network in the face of growing volatility. These conclusions 
are largely in tune with the points stressed in the social-capital literature. 
 





 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Within any socio-economic environment, the network of social interaction is the
backbone that underlies its overall operation. The role of the social network
is two-fold. On the one hand, of course, it determines how agents come into
contact to carry out their economic activities. But, complementary to this,
the social network also maps how the relevant information required to conduct
those activities ﬂows among the agents. To shed light, therefore, on the inter-
play between behavior and information that is at the core of so many social
phenomena, it is important to have a proper understanding of the main forces
that underlie the network of social interaction.
In principle, this network should be conceived as an endogenous outcome
of agents’ decisions, much in the same way as any other dimension of choice,
e.g. whether to play a certain game or undertake some investment. Networking
decisions, however, are particularly interesting in that they display the following
features:
(i) A new social link is typically initiated and supported by a small collection
of players — say, bilaterally — but it may induce important externalities
on the general social system. For example, it may open new channels
of communication that could prove crucial for implementing wide social
gains.
(ii) The establishment and maintenance of links is costly (e.g. time consum-
ing) and therefore “investment” in them should respond to the usual eco-
nomic considerations, i.e. opportunity costs.
(iii) The accumulation of links is bound to be only gradual, since the adjust-
ment costs entailed by a very fast rate of link formation are typically
prohibitive.
(iv) Preexisting links depreciate in that, for example, the value of the activity
and interaction they support may become obsolete or/and not so reward-
ing (relative to other options) as it used to be.
The features listed above are standard in many problems of investment and
suggest conceiving the process of network formation as the accumulation of a
special kind of capital — social capital. The term “social capital” has been used
in recent times with a variety of diﬀerent meanings, some of them perhaps too
vague or devoid of operational content.1 Here, I focus on one of the most widely
agreed incarnations of this concept. I identify the stock of social capital enjoyed
by a certain community with the density and stability of its social network. This,
of course, is motivated by the implicit assumption that some dense and stable
1Even though some have pointed to an earlier origin, it was arguably James Coleman (see
Coleman (1988)) who brought the notion of social capital to prominence in the sociological,
and then economic, literature. For a good and recent overview on the use and possible misuse
of this concept, see Woolcock (2000), whose discussion mostly focuses on development issues.
3interaction has positive welfare implications, and should typically be correlated
with high overall payoﬀs. (Admittedly, this assumption may not suitable for
some applications, as stressed, for example, by Durlauf (1999).)
To address the aforementioned issues in a simple and paradigmatic context,
I propose a model where players are involved in a collection of pairwise Inﬁnitely
Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemmas (IRPD). Every pair of agents which happens to
be linked in the social network play an idiosyncratic version of this game (i.e.
cooperation and relative opportunistic gains typically diﬀer across pairs). These
games are played independently, in the sense that the choices made in each of
them (cooperation or defection) are adopted independently at each stage by the
players involved. The diﬀerent games, however, are not strategically indepen-
dent since the behavior of a player in one of the games she plays can be made
dependent on what has previously happened in other games.2 Such information
on past behavior, however, is not assumed to diﬀuse instantaneously. Rather, it
is supposed to “travel” gradually (one step/link at a time) along the network.
Of course, only when it arrives to any particular player can the latter’s choice
be aﬀected by it — say, triggering a punishment to a then-revealed defector.
In this context, it is apparent that the range of incentive-compatible be-
havior that can be supported in the inﬁnitely repeated population game must
be crucially dependent on the architecture of the underlying network. And
reciprocally, of course, the particular network that should prevail — more specif-
ically, which links will be formed and which removed — also has to depend on
the payoﬀs that can be earned in an incentive-compatible fashion. To formalize
these considerations, I deﬁne the notion of Pairwise-Stable Network (PSN), that
combines standard ideas from the literature on repeated games with the concept
of pairwise stability found in the matching and network-formation literatures.
Informally, a PSN is a network in which each of its extant links supports bilat-
eral cooperation when every player uses optimal trigger strategies in all of her
(repeated) interactions.
In line with the dynamic approach of the paper, a PSN may be conceived
as the rest point of an adjustment process resulting from the accumulation of
revision opportunities enjoyed by diﬀerent pairs of connected players. Thus,
the ﬁr s ts t e pu n d e r t a k e ni nt h ep a p e ri st ocharacterize such networks. I ﬁnd
that rather ﬁne details of the architecture of the network, in conjunction with
players’ strategic incentives in the repeated games, are important to understand
pairwise stability. For example, a key consideration that generally underpins the
stability of a link (i.e. the incentives of both players to cooperate and thus keep
their connection) is the existence of other “valuable” neighbors who are not too
distant apart and could punish either deviation without much delay. In other
2A related approach can be found in Bernheim and Whinston (1990). These authors
explore whether multimarket interaction enhances the collusion possibilities of an oligopoly.
The key diﬀerence with the present approach is that, in their case, the same set of ﬁrms is
assumed to interact in all markets simultaneously and, consequently, the information on the
past behavior of other oligopolists may be brought to bear immediately on all markets. That
is, in their case, the strategically relevant information spreads instantaneously throughout all
interactions.
4words, some measure of network cohesiveness (or “cliquishness”) turns out to
be important in supporting network stability.
As explained, however, the primary objective of the paper is not static but
dynamic. Our aim, therefore, is to shed light on how, over time, the strategic
incentives to cooperate interplay with the considerations underlying the forma-
tion of the social network. To this end, an adjustment (evolutionary) process is
postulated that is taken to proceed on a “slow” time scale, relative to the rate
at which the stage game is repeated. The main features of this process can be
summarized as follows.
First, as a basic step in the adjustment, and prior to any actual play, every
pair of connected players is given the opportunity to check the stability of their
respective links. Doing so, only the links which are able to support bilateral
cooperation are maintained. If this mechanism were to operate by itself, it is
quite clear that it would eventually lead to a pairwise-stable network (possibly
empty) that is a certain subset of the original one. Thus, to enrich the dynamics,
we add, in every period, two sources of “change and innovation”:
(1) Update of payoﬀ conditions: the payoﬀs of existing links are changed with
some (small) independent probability, say ε > 0. This probability — a key
parameter of the model — is interpreted as a stylized measure of environ-
mental volatility.
(2) Search and link creation: Each player can support a maximum pre-speciﬁed
number of total links. Within this limitation, however, every player re-
ceives (with some independent probability) the opportunity of forming a
fresh new link with some new player she “knows” — i.e. with someone to
whom she is connected through a network path.
By making search and link creation a network-bound task, the process in-
duced by (1)-(2) displays acute path dependencies that render initial conditions
overly powerful in the determination of long-run behavior. (For example, an
initially empty social network would remain so forever, since no individual ever
“knows” any other one with whom to connect.) This seems too-rigid a formu-
lation and suggests extending (2) as follows:
(2+) Enhanced search and link creation: In addition to (2), with some (small)
independent probability, every player enjoys the possibility of forming a
new link with a previously “unknown” player — i.e. with someone in
another component of the social network.
The stochastic process where the removal of pairwise-unstable links is com-
plemented by payoﬀ update (1) and enhanced search (2+) will be proven to be
ergodic. Its long-run behavior, therefore, is univocally summarized, indepen-
dently of initial conditions, by its unique invariant distribution. This invariant
distribution will be characterized in some particular scenarios — for example,
when the range of admissible payoﬀs is low or when the payoﬀ environment is
stable (i.e. ε =0 ) . These parameter conﬁgurations represent an useful bench-
mark of comparison for the general case. For less extreme scenarios, however,
5an analytical characterization of the long-run behavior seems unfeasible. But
then, the fact that the process is ergodic aﬀords an indirect way of “computing”
the long-run invariant magnitudes of any variable of interest. For, by virtue of
ergodicity, the empirical averages obtained along any simulation run must con-
verge almost surely to the theoretical averages induced by the unique invariant
distribution.
The former considerations suggest that numerical simulations are a sound
way of obtaining suitable estimates of the long-run behavior of the system. Here,
therefore, we pursue this route but complement it with a summary of the ana-
lytical discussion of the model undertaken by Marsili, Slanina & Vega-Redondo
(2002). In this companion paper, we rely on the mean-ﬁeld techniques widely
used in statistical physics to formulate a suitable deterministic approximation of
the dynamic behavior of the model that embodies many of its essential features.
In combination, both approaches, numerical and analytical, jointly provide a
rich perspective on the nature and intuition of the results.
In our discussion of the model, most of our eﬀorts will be devoted to under-
standing the long-run relationships among the following variables:
• network density, as given by the average degree (or connectivity) of the
nodes (i.e. players).
• network cohesiveness,a sr e ﬂected by the average distance between the
neighbors of every given node — that is, a measure of how closely connected
are the neighbors of a typical player.
• network span, as embodied by the relative size of the largest components
or, relatedly, by the number of distinct agents who fall within a some given
radius of some typical player.
• payoﬀ performance, as given by the average payoﬀ earned per interaction
(i.e. across all links).
As a “numerical conﬁrmation” of ergodicity, the simulation paths indeed
show convergence of the empirical average magnitudes of the above listed vari-
ables to a given value (i.e. their ergodic mean), even when the process starts
from very diﬀerent initial conditions. Our main concern then is to understand
how these long-run summaries of process depend on the underlying data of en-
vironment (i.e. on the parameters of the model). Very succinctly, the main
regularities can be summarized as follows.
(a) The long-run density of the network depends negatively on ε, the ex-
tent of payoﬀ volatility. So happens as well with payoﬀ performance. In
this sense, therefore, one obtains the intuitive conclusion that volatility is
detrimental not only to the accumulation of social capital but also to the
materialized payoﬀs.
(b) As the environment’s volatility rises, the population “protects” from it by
endogenously increasing the cohesiveness of the social network.
6(c) Whenever the society is able to sustain a dense social network, its archi-
tecture displays a high span, which turns out to be a crucial feature in
enhancing the eﬀectiveness of search (and thus adaptability).
(d) The detrimental eﬀect of volatility mentioned in (a) is, in fact, strongly
mitigated by the strategic eﬀects availed by the social network. If, by way
of contrast, players refrained from using network eﬀects to support cooper-
ation (i.e. every bilateral IRPD game were strategically independent), the
“harmful” eﬀects of volatility would manifest themselves at much lower
levels and in a substantially more abrupt fashion.
The above conclusions underscore the intuitive point that a "stable environ-
ment" may be an important requirement for successful accumulation of social
capital. That is, only if agents’ payoﬀ conditions are not altered too fast can
one hope that a dense social network of cooperation may be sustained over time.
Indeed, we shall also see that the transition from a low- to a high-accumulation
path may respond very drastically to just very slight changes of the underlying
conditions. In a sense, this may be regarded as a stylized explanation of sudden
"miracles" (or anti-miracles) in development or growth of the sort stressed, for
example, by Lucas (1988).
Another important insight of the analysis concerns the way in which the
architecture of social interaction responds endogenously to the underlying cir-
cumstances of the environment, thus attempting to oﬀset its main detrimental
implications. Somewhat schematically, the essential two features of the net-
work architecture that bear on performance are cohesiveness and span.A n d ,
in accord with intuition, we observe that this trade-oﬀ moves in favor of cohe-
siveness (and away from span) as environmental volatility increases. It is worth
advancing, however, that the process always tends to keep some balance be-
tween these two polar features, thus preserving — if volatility is not too intense
— a “small-world”3 architecture for the (endogenous) social network.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next, Section 2 presents the
model — ﬁrst, its static version in Subsection 2.1, then its dynamic counterpart
in Subsection 2.2. The analysis of the model starts in Section 3 with the charac-
terization of pairwise-stable networks. It proceeds with the dynamics in Section
4, which consists of two subsections: Subsection 4.1, that establishes some basic
dynamic results (e..g the ergodicity of the process), and Subsection 4.2 that
contains the bulk of our numerical analysis. In this latter subsection, the dis-
cussion starts with a benchmark scenario, followed by the consideration of a
number of extensions and variants. Next, in Section 5 the mean-ﬁeld analysis
of the model is outlined, comparing its conclusions with the numerical simu-
lations. Finally, in Section 6 the related literature is reviewed, while Section
7o ﬀers some concluding remarks and a number of possible courses for future
research.
3The notion of a small world — a network that displays both short distances and strong
cohesiveness (or clusterization) — has been the object of booming research since the seminal
work of Watts and Strogatz (1998).
72M o d e l
2.1 Statics
Let N = {1,2,...,n} be a ﬁnite population of agents who may interact through
a collection of inﬁnitely repeated games. For each pair of players who actually
interact, i, j ∈ N, the stage game they play is an idiosyncratic Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD) with payoﬀ table
j
i C D
C ζij ζij − ν
D ζij + ν 0
(1)
with ν > ζij(= ζji) > 0.A s c u s t o m a r y , C and D will be labelled as “Coop-
erate” and “Defect,” respectively. The payoﬀ obtained by both players if they
jointly cooperate is denoted by ζij. This payoﬀ is ij-speciﬁc and, in the dynamic
framework to be considered later on, it will change over time. For simplicity,
the payoﬀ of joint defection is normalized to zero, whereas in case of a unilateral
defection the gain ν obtained by the defector over ζij is made equal to the loss
incurred her partner. To ﬁx ideas, one possible interpretation of the situation
is that the interaction between players i and j concerns the implementation of
a joint project of total value 2ζij, which is either divided equally if both be-
have “honestly” or allows the individual who unilaterally behaves dishonestly
to appropriate an excess payoﬀ of v at the expense of the other party.
In general, of course, not all players interact among themselves. The spec-
iﬁcation of who does is given by the social network, as captured by a certain
graph g ⊂ N ×N, where the nodes are identiﬁed with the players and (i,i) / ∈ g
for any i ∈ N. Naturally, this graph is undirected so that, for all i,j ∈ N,
(i,j) ∈ g ⇐⇒ (j,i) ∈ g. Typically, the more compact notation ij (or ji) will
be used to denote the link between player i and j. Furthermore, we shall write
g−ij or g+ij to represent the networks obtained from g by, respectively, adding
or removing a link ij.
Given the prevailing network g, all pairs of players i and j such that ij ∈ g
are involved in an Inﬁnitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IRPD) with idiosyn-
cratic stage payoﬀs given by their respective ζij — cf. (1). Each of these diﬀerent
IRPD are choice independent, in the sense that players’ decisions in any one of
them do not restrict the feasible behavior in others. They need not be, how-
ever, strategically independent since the behavior in some of them may be made
contingent on the information of what has occurred in others.
A key feature of the present approach is that information on how players
have behaved in the past diﬀuses through the social network only gradually.
Speciﬁcally, it is assumed that, in every round of play of the IRPD played
between two “neighbors” (i.e. connected players), each of them informs the
other one of any worthwhile detail they might be informed at that point — most
8crucially, of any deviation by other players from notionally prescribed behavior.
In this manner, relevant strategic information “travels” along the network one
step (or link) at a time. The essential implication of this assumption is that, in
general, the architecture of the network has an important bearing on the extent
of cooperation that the population as a whole can support in an incentive-
compatible manner.
To simplify matters, let us suppose that players rely on trigger strategies
(see Remark 2 for further discussion). In the present context, these strategies
will be assumed to have the following format:
(a) ﬁrst, players choose, separately with each neighbor, whether to start their
bilateral interaction by cooperation or defection;
(b) subsequently, they immediately react to the news that one of her own
neighbors has formerly behaved as a unilateral defector (with any player)
by “punishing” her, i.e. by switching to irreversible defection in the cor-
responding bilateral IRPD played with that neighbor.
Now, under the assumption that players rely on trigger strategies, let us
introduce the following convenient notation. Given some prevailing network g
and any given player i, denote by
Ni ≡ {j ∈ N : ij ∈ g}
the set of her neighbors. For any one of these neighbors j ∈ Ni, let g
ij
∼ a stand
for the situation (i.e. strategy proﬁle) where cooperation is the initial action of
both players for every link in g, except for the initial action of player i in link ij
which is a ∈ {C,D}.T h i s s t r a t e g y p r o ﬁle univocally induces a corresponding











∼ a) represents the stage payoﬀ earned by player i with k at stage
τ. Then, denoting by δ ∈ (0,1) the common discount factor, the payoﬀ ﬂow (2)










Finally, the latter discounted payoﬀs can be aggregated to obtain the total payoﬀ


















We are now in a position to deﬁne the notion of Pairwise-Stable Network
(PSN). Informally, it simply consists of a network where, for every separate link,
9the two players involved have incentives to use it for cooperation. Thus, this
notion implicitly embodies the idea that, unless both of the players connected
by each link can separately conﬁrm its incentives for cooperation, that link will
vanish. A formal deﬁnition of this idea follows.
Deﬁnition 1 An undirected graph g ⊂ N × N is said be a Pairwise-Stable
Network if for all ij ∈ g,
πi(g
ij
∼ C) ≥ πi(g
ij
∼ D).
To end this subsection, the following remark clariﬁes certain interesting is-
sues concerning the use of trigger strategies in the present context.
Remark 2 — Trigger strategies, maximal punishment, and perfection:
As formulated, the PSN concept directly embodies the assumption that players
restrict to trigger strategies. This restriction was justiﬁed above on the grounds
of simplicity. But in line with well-known results on the theory of repeated
games (see Abreu(1988)), a further justiﬁcation may be grounded in the fact that
those strategies induce maximal punishments in the IRPD. They can be used,
therefore, to support any incentive-compatible behavior — in other words, any
outcome which could be supported by other, possibly more complex, strategies
can be supported as well through those of a trigger type. In this sense, these
strategies can be postulated without loss of generality if one is interested alone
in characterizing incentive-compatible behavior.
Trigger strategies, however, raise in the present context a problem concern-
ing issues of credibility (or perfection). In particular, it is not generally optimal
for a player to punish a neighbor when news about the latter’s deviant behav-
ior arrives. For, by eschewing such a punishment, the player anticipates being
able to sustain cooperation with her neighbor, an alternative which may well
be preferred if such a reciprocal cooperation can indeed be induced. A natural
way to address this conceptual problem is to modify the stability concept (and,
correspondingly, enrich the set of admissible strategies) so that any potential
defector is given the possibility of anticipating, and reacting optimally to, ensu-
ing punishment. This, in turn, makes punishment of a (sophisticated) deviator
optimal when the news to that eﬀect arrive, even if the deviator has always
cooperated. Such considerations give rise to what might be called a Sophisti-
cated Pairwise-Stable Network (SPSN), a concept which displays the following
advantages. Firstly, it has the virtue of guaranteeing stability with respect to
the set of all possible strategies. Secondly, it is “perfect” in the sense of be-
ing supported by strategies that are optimal after every history — in particular,
therefore, it renders punishment an optimal response in every case. In contrast,
however, the main drawback of the SPSN concept is that, while it is substan-
tially more complex to formalize and characterize than its non-sophisticated
counterpart, its qualitative implication sa r ee s s e n t i a l l yt h es a m e—s e eR e m a r k
5. All combined, therefore, it seems well advised to focus on the PSN concept,
for the sake of analytical simplicity and expositional clarity. A
102.2 Dynamics
The equilibrium approach introduced so far represents an intermediate stage
towards a fully dynamic description of the situation. To carry out the latter,
however, we ﬁrst need to propose in detail the law of motion that is to govern
the social dynamics. This is the object of the present subsection.
Let time be modelled discretely, with t =0 ,1,2,... indexing the consecutive
periods. At every t, each player i ∈ N supports a certain number of links (what
are called her direct links), while he may be also connected to other players
through the latter’s direct links — what may be called that player’s passive links.
Each of these links (active or passive) has a certain payoﬀ potential associated to
it, which is identiﬁed with the cooperation payoﬀ in the stage PD game played
by the two agents thus connected. Under the assumption that the support of
a link is a resource-consuming activity, an important feature of the model is
that players are limited to supporting a maximum number of links, say m, an
exogenous parameter.
The above considerations suggest identifying the state of the system at
(the beginning of) any given t by a list ω(t) ≡ [Li(t)]i∈N where each Li(t)=
{(j1,ζij1), (j2,ζij2),...(jr,ζijr)} speciﬁes the collection of individuals j1,j 2,...,jr ∈
N\{i} to whom player i supports a (direct) link, as well as the corresponding
payoﬀs ζij1,ζij2,ζijr ∈ R+ associated to each such link. As indicated, the car-
dinality r of the set Li(t) must not exceed m. Given any such state ω(t), the
induced social network g(t) is simply formed by declaring two individuals i and
j linked if there is a (direct) link between them, in either direction. Thus,
formally, we have:4
ij ∈ g(t) ⇔ (j,·) ∈ Li(t) ∨ (i,·) ∈ Lj(t),
the induced set of neighbors for any player i being denoted by Ni(g(t)).
The social dynamics deﬁning the law of motion across consecutive states
embodies three distinct sequential components: payoﬀ update, link formation
and search, removal of unstable links. I take up each of these in turn.
1. Payoﬀ update
First, we suppose that the payoﬀ of each link may be subject to a random
update of its associated payoﬀ. More precisely, with some independent proba-





ij is drawn afresh from some non-negative real interval [ζ,ζ] ac-
cording to a stationary (and common) probability distribution with continuous
density fζ. For future reference, denote by ω (t)=[ L 
i(t)]i∈N the new set of links
thus generated, with g (t) (equal, in fact, to g(t)) standing for the corresponding
network.
4For simplicity, it will be assumed that (redundant) direct links in both directions do not
exist between any pair of players. In fact, by asuming that there are no such links at the
beginning of the process, the dynamics of link formation guarantee that they will never arise
later on.
112. Link formation and search
In every period, every player i ∈ N may enjoy two possible routes of search
and consequent formation of fresh links: component-bound (“local”) search and
unrestricted (“global”) search. Whereas the ﬁrst route is conceived as the “or-
dinary” way of accessing new information (i.e. mediated by the social network),
the second one is regarded as more extraordinary (and thus only occasional).
Formally, we shall posit that, with independent probability p, the ﬁrst option
arises, whereas with probability (1−p)q the second one occurs.5 I describe each
of these alternative options in turn.
(2.a) Component-bound search
Given g (t), let Ci(g (t)) represent the set of players who belong to the same
component as i in g (t) — i.e. those players for whom there is a path in g (t)
joining them to node i.6 When some player i receives a component-bound revi-
sion opportunity, let us suppose that she receives information on new ‘projects’
to be undertaken with each of the players in her component with whom she is
not already interacting. More precisely, she is taken to observe a set of possible
new links with the individuals in Ci(g (t))\Ni(g (t)), with its associated pay-
oﬀs having been drawn afresh according to the probability density fζ. Let S0
i (t)
stand for the set of these links. Out of this set, player i should be interested only
in those who she perceives as pairwise-stable, given the prevailing state ω (t)
and the induced network g (t). Denote by S1
i (t)(⊂ S0
i (t)) the set of those links
which display such pairwise-stability,7 and let l∗
i =( j∗,ζij∗) be the particular
link (or any one of them, randomly chosen, if there are several) which provides
the highest payoﬀ. Then, two cases must be distinguished.
(i) If the cardinality |L 
i(t)| <m ,and therefore player i is not currently satu-
rating her link-supporting capability, then the new set of links supported
by her is simply made equal to L  
i (t)=L 
i(t) ∪ {(j∗,ζij∗)}.
(ii) If, instead, |L 
i(t)| = m, the new set L  
i (t) is formed by the m links in
L 
i(t) ∪ {(j∗,ζij∗)} with highest payoﬀs.
5Therefore, with probability (1−p)(1−q), any given player receives no revision opportunity
whatsoever.
6Subsection 4.2.4 considers an arguably more realistic variant of the model where fresh
links can only be formed with players who are close to them — i.e. in their own component,
but within a short “search radius” . It turns out that the main gist of the analysis is unchanged
by this modiﬁcation.
7F o r m a l l y ,w ea d a p tt h en o t a t i o nu s e di nD e ﬁnition 1 and say that a new link of player i
















i() and π 
j() reﬂect the payoﬀs displayed in ω (t).
12(2.b) Unrestricted search
If some player i receives a revision opportunity through global search, she
gets to observe the possibility of forming a new link l 
i =( j ,ζij ), where j is
any player in N\Ni(g (t)) and, again, ζij  is drawn according to the probability
density fζ. Suppose that l 
i is pairwise-stable, given ω (t). Then, as above, the
set L  
i (t) of new links of player i is simply made equal to L 
i(t) ∪ {(j ,ζij )} if
|L 
i(t)| <m ,w h e r e a si ti si d e n t i ﬁed with the subset of m links with the highest
payoﬀ otherwise. Finally, if l 
i is not perceived as pairwise-stable by player i,i t
is simply ignored and no actual revision occurs.
3. Removal of pairwise-unstable links
Let ω  (t)=[ L  
i (t)]i∈N,w i t hg   denoting the induced network and π  
i (·)
the payoﬀs associated to the corresponding payoﬀ proﬁle [ζ
  
ij]ij∈g  (t). (For no-
tational simplicity, I dispense with the time index.) Then, for every link ij ∈ g  ,
let the players i and j involved in the link evaluate whether both of the following
incentive-compatibility conditions hold:
π  
i (g   ij
∼ C) ≥ π  
i (g   ij
∼ D)
π  
j(g   ji
∼ C) ≥ π  
j(g   ji
∼ D).
If either of these conditions is violated, the link ij is judged unstable by the
players and thus is removed.8 Once such a check of pairwise-stability has been
completed for all links in g  , let ω   (t) refer to the resulting state where only
the links that qualiﬁed as pairwise-stable remain. This state is then carried over
to the next period, by making ω(t +1 )=ω   (t).
3 Static analysis: characterization of Pairwise-
Stability
As we did in the presentation of the model, it is useful to start our discussion
with an equilibrium (thus static) approach, subsequently enriching matters with
af u l l - ﬂedged dynamic analysis. Proposition 3 below initiates this course by pro-
viding an intuitive characterization of Pairwise-Stable Networks. As suggested
in our informal discussion, this characterization crucially hinges upon a certain
measure of cohesiveness of the network, as given by suitably deﬁned geodesic
distances concerning the neighbors of the diﬀerent players. Formally, for any
given player i ∈ N, and any two of her neighbors j,k ∈ Ni, we deﬁne the i-
excluding distance between j and k, denoted by di(j,k),a st h el e n g t ho ft h e
shortest path joining j and k which do not involve player i. The interpretation
8Note that, in the spirit of Deﬁnition 1, we are making the assumption that each player
evaluates separately the stability of each of her diﬀerent links. Moreover, for the sake of
tractability, we also make the assumption that all considerations are made with respect to the
same network g   prevailing at the start of the link-removal operation.
13of this distance is straightforward: it is the number of steps (and therefore peri-
ods, in the repeated game) which are required for an information held by j (or
k) to reach k (or j) without the concourse of player i. As usual, it is postulated
that di(j,j)=0for any j ∈ Ni, while if no i-excluding path exists between k
and j it will be convenient to posit that di(j,k)=∞.
Proposition 3 Consider any network g ⊂ N × N and let [ζij]ij∈g stand for
the possible cooperation payoﬀs that can be earned for each of its links. Then, g













Proof. Consider any link ij ∈ g and focus, for concreteness, on player i.
Pairwise-stability of this link requires that player i h a si n c e n t i v e st oc o o p e r a t e
with j under the threat that, if she were to do otherwise, all his neighbors k ∈ Ni
will switch to defection once they learn about it — an event that, for each of
them, occurs di(j,k) periods after the contemplated defection takes place.







Instead, if player i defects unilaterally upon j, her anticipated payoﬀ is:
πi(g
ij




























Therefore, the stability condition
πi(g
ij
∼ C) ≥ πi(g
ij
∼ D)










which is readily seen to be equivalent to (5).
9Recall that stage payoﬀs are normalized by the factor (1 − δ).
14Remark 4 Network stability in the absence of network eﬀects:
If players did not rely on network (population-wide) eﬀects in their strategic
considerations, cooperation could be supported through any particular link ij





Contrasting (5) with (6), it immediately follows that, naturally, network-based
eﬀects can only help in supporting cooperation, i.e. the latter condition always
implies the former. In general, the strength of those eﬀects positively depends
on the number of neighbors a player has, how valuable these are (i.e. the
opportunity cost of spoiling cooperation with them), and their relevant distance
(which impinges on the delay aﬀecting the aforementioned costs).
It should be emphasized, however, that even in the absence of network strate-
gic eﬀects, the architecture of players’ interaction may have an important bear-
ing on the social dynamics through its eﬀect on search and innovation. This, in
fact, will be conﬁrmed by the dynamic analysis of such a scenario (cf. Subsection
4.2.2), where some of the regularities displayed by the basic model still arise. For
example, payoﬀ volatility continues to have a negative impact on long-run per-
formance, even though many of the important features that go along with this
phenomenon (e.g. network cohesiveness, payoﬀ performance, etc.) are sharply
aﬀected by the absence of network-mediated feedback on players’ behavior. A
Remark 5 Network stability with higher player sophistication:
In Remark 2, we discussed the possibility of allowing players a superior degree
of sophistication that would allow them to anticipate the stage at which others
would punish her for a deviation, thus reacting optimally to it through non-
trigger strategies. Space limitations prevent us from developing in detail the
implications of the stability concept which would reﬂect these considerations and
that we called Sophisticated PSN. The interested reader, however, may verify
that, as a counterpart of (5), the condition characterizing pairwise-stability in












For the sake of a more transparent comparison, the above condition can be












One then observes that similar qualitative considerations arise in both cases —
i.e. the number, payoﬀ value, and relevant distances of neighbors continue to
15be the key factors involved. In (7), however, the higher sophistication assumed
on the part of players (which allows them a preemptive reaction to punishment)
leads to weaker deterrence against deviations. This, in turn, narrows — but
certainly does not destroy — the range of circumstances in which a suﬃciently
cohesive social network enlarges signiﬁcantly the cooperation possibilities. A
4 Network dynamics
4.1 Ergodicity and other preliminary results
Suppose that no fresh links were ever formed through search (i.e. p = q =0 )
and prevailing payoﬀs were not subject to update (ε =0 ) . Then, the resulting
deterministic dynamics would reduce to a mere chain of link removals, as the
links which are deemed unstable are being discontinued by the agents involved.
This restricted dynamics would obviously lead to a stationary situation, possibly
an empty network. In this sense, it may be regarded as providing a simple
dynamic foundation of the PSN concept introduced in Deﬁnition 1. But our
main interest, of course, is geared towards the study of the full-ﬂedged stochastic
dynamics where link removal is countered by search and link formation, as well
as the underlying payoﬀ conditions are subject to occasional change. Only in
this case, with p,q,ε > 0, the full richness of our model is suitably displayed.
A ﬁrst basic step to be undertaken in the analysis of such stochastic dynam-
ics is the establishment of conditions under which the induced Markov process
can be ensured ergodic. As advanced, such ergodicity will provide a theoreti-
cal basis for the later use of numerical simulations in elucidating the long-run
behavior of the system. To state matters formally, recall that fζ(·) stands for
the probability density with governs every fresh draw of payoﬀs, whose support
is given by a non-negative interval [ζ,ζ]. F u r t h e rr e m e m b e rf r o m( 6 )t h a t1−δ
δ ν
is the threshold to be exceeded by any cooperation payoﬀ ζij which is to be
supportable by players i and j without resorting to network eﬀects (i.e. bilat-
erally). In this terms, the following result states that ergodicity is guaranteed
as long as, for any payoﬀ value redrawn afresh, there is some prior uncertainty
as to its “supportability” in the absence of network eﬀects.
Proposition 6 Assume ζ < 1−δ
δ ν < ζ and ε,q > 0. Then, provided the pop-
ulation N is large enough, the social dynamics described in Subsection 2.2 is
governed by an ergodic stochastic process.
Proof. The induced process is clearly aperiodic. Therefore, to establish the
desired conclusion, it is enough to show that there is some particular state to
which there is positive probability of returning, from any other state, in some
ﬁnite number of steps. In the argument, the state ωe where there are no links
established between players will play this recurrent role.
The ﬁrst point to note is that, if n is large enough, there is positive prob-
ability that the network might be eventually divided into two or more disjoint
components. To see how this could occur, suppose that n is even and let the
16population be partitioned into two disjoint subsets, say N1 = {1,2,..,n
2} and
N2 = {n
2 +1 , n
2 +2 ,...,n}. Then, revision opportunities may arise (possibly
through unrestricted search — recall (2.b) in Subsection 2.2) so that players in
N1 obtain payoﬀ options ζij with players j ∈ N2 satisfying:





and reciprocally for players in N2. These revision opportunities induce pairwise-
stable and payoﬀ-improving links for each player in Nu over those that could
be supported with agents in the complementary set Nv (u,v =1 ,2,u = v).
Therefore, if n is large enough (in particular, it is enough that n ≥ 2(2m +1 ) ) ,
all links across N1 and N2 would eventually be removed.
Thus suppose that players are divided into such disjoint components, and
let each player in Nu in turn receive an unrestricted revision opportunity with
some player in Nv (v  = u) whose associated payoﬀ is higher than any prevailing
one (but lower than ζ). Then, the corresponding link must be formed (removing
one of the pre-existing ones), since that link will be perceived as pairwise stable.
Now suppose that, subsequently, the link is subject to a payoﬀ update, with the
consequence that its payoﬀ is lowered below 1−δ
δ ν. This leads to the link being
removed, since it is the only link which currently connects the sets N1 and N2
and, therefore, players cannot rely on network eﬀects to support cooperation
with it. By proceeding in this fashion with all players in turn as needed, it
is clear that the process would reach the empty network. By construction, the
chain of steps involved is ﬁnite and displays positive probability, thus completing
the proof.
The former result clariﬁes that some payoﬀ volatility (i.e. ε > 0) is generally
needed to achieve ergodicity of the process. But the role played by ε in the
analysis is not merely technical (i.e. to ensure ergodicity), but represents one of
the key factors motivating both the the model and the questions asked. It is of
central interest, therefore, to gain insight into the role it plays in the long-run
dynamics of the process, understanding its interplay with other features of the
model, e.g. payoﬀs. At this point of the discussion, a useful ﬁrst step in this
endeavor is aﬀorded by the following result, which maintains all the hypotheses
of Proposition 6 except for assuming that ε =0 .
Proposition 7 Assume ζ < 1−δ
δ ν < ζ and q>0. Then, if ε =0 , the social
dynamics leads almost surely to a path where the network reaches the maximum
connectivity and the induced total payoﬀ (aggregated over the whole population)
converges to it maximum value 4mnζ.
Proof. To establish the desired conclusion, the key role is played by the follow-
ing two observations:
(1) Consider any η > 0 such that ζ − η > 1−δ
δ ν. Then, since the density fζ(·)
is assumed continuous on its support [ζ,ζ] and revision opportunities are
17independent across players and time, the following conclusion applies. For
all θ > 0, there is some T such that if t ≥ T, there is probability no lower
than 1−θ that every player i has received (in preceding periods τ <t ) at
least m link formation opportunities with associated payoﬀs ζij > ζ − η.
(2) Any of the link opportunities described in (1) are pairwise stable. There-
fore, choosing θ and T as above, there is probability no lower than 1 − θ
that, if t ≥ T, every player i is supporting m links at t (the maximum
number), all of them with associated payoﬀsn ol o w e rt h a nζ − η.
Thus, since η and θ in (1)-(2) can be chosen arbitrarily small, the desired
conclusion immediately follows.
The previous result indicates that, in the absence of payoﬀ volatility (ε =
0), the accumulation of social capital eventually reaches its maximum level of
fruition. This in turn highlights the importance of such volatility in having
other features of the dynamics — e.g. the evolving network architecture — enjoy
some inﬂuence in shaping the long-run performance.
To further clarify the implications of Proposition 7, note that, if ε =0 ,
the process is no longer guaranteed to be ergodic and, therefore, one can no
longer speak of a uniquely induced behavior in the long-run. Thus, in prin-
ciple, the conclusion stated in the above proposition may arise in conjunction
with long-run dependence of initial conditions concerning some other underlying
features of the situation — e.g. the speciﬁcs of the network architecture. How-
ever, the fact that the invariant distribution of any Markov process is always
upper hemi-continuous in its parameters implies that, for low but positive ε,
the (then unique) long run behavior of the process must continue to display,
approximately, the same features established by the result.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that a crucial assumption in Proposition 7
is that 1−δ
δ ν < ζ. This amounts to saying that, with some positive probability,
af r e s hp a y o ﬀ draw may give rise to a potential a link which could be supported
without resorting to network eﬀects. To underscore the importance of this
assumption, it may be useful to introduce the following observation.
Remark 8 Network dynamics under stringent payoﬀ conditions:
Suppose that, unlike what has been assumed above, ζ < 1−δ
δ ν. Then, it is
straightforward to see, that for any ε ≥ 0 (thus, in particular, even in no payoﬀ
volatility exists), if the process starts with an empty network — i.e. what was
labelled state ωe in the proof of Proposition 6 — the network remains empty
forever after. The simple reason for this is that, under these circumstances, no
potential link is ever perceived as pairwise stable. Therefore, no link is ever
formed, making the state ωe an absorbing state. In contrast with Proposition
7, this points to the fact that the the long-run behavior of the system displays
some sharp qualitative dependence on the payoﬀ conditions. A
Combining Proposition 7 and Remark 8, a rich interplay is suggested be-
tween the exogenous conditions that determine payoﬀs and the extent of their
18volatility. To explore this relationship, possible trade-oﬀs, and their implications
for the long-run performance of the process is the object of the next sections.
4.2 Numerical analysis
Motivated by the considerations explained in the previous Subsection, we now
undertake an analysis of the model based on numerical simulations. First, the
analysis will focus on a benchmark scenario where payoﬀ conditions are set at
the interesting “low edge” of the relevant region and players are allowed to take
full advantage of network eﬀects in supporting cooperation. Then, in subsequent
subsections, we shall turn to exploring how the analysis is aﬀected if players do
not rely on network eﬀects or the payoﬀ conditions change — e.g. become more
stringent.
4.2.1 A benchmark scenario
Consider a environment deﬁned by the following parameter values. There are
100(= n) individuals involved in repeated interaction with a common discount
rate δ =3 /4 and a stage PD game with payoﬀsa sg i v e nb y( 1 )f o rν =4 .
The cooperation payoﬀs ζij are drawn, randomly and independently, according
to a uniform distribution over the interval [ζ,ζ]=[ 0 .4,1.4]. Thus, as required
by Proposition 6, the threshold
ν(1−δ)
δ = 4
3 which marks the possibility of sup-
porting cooperation bilaterally (cf. (6)) belongs to the payoﬀ support. More
speciﬁcally, it may be computed that any new payoﬀ draw exceeds that thresh-
old with an ex-ante probability of 1/15.
The rate at which individuals receive search and revision opportunities is
chosen to be p =0 .1 if they are component-bound, and q =0 .01 if they are
unrestricted. On the other hand, the maximum number of links that any given
player can actively support is set to m =2(therefore, the maximum average
degree one may ever observe is equal to four).
The typical simulation runs will stretch for half million periods (T =5 ×105),
a time horizon which always proves suﬃcient to attain long-run convergence in
a clear-cut fashion. Our analysis of these simulations will focus on the key
variables used in our earlier discussion: network density (average node degree),
network cohesiveness (average neighbor distance), network span (relative size
of the largest components), and payoﬀ performance (average payoﬀ earned per
link). The main concern is to determine their respective long-run magnitudes,
understanding how these long-run values depend on the essential details of the
environment. As advanced, the key parameter in the analysis turns out to be
the volatility rate ε, which will thus occupy a central role in our discussion. In
a later subsection, however, we shall also discuss brieﬂyh o wt h eb e h a v i o ro f
the model is aﬀected by changes in other parameters of the model such as, for
example, the width of the payoﬀ support.
For the scenario just described, we start our discussion with Figures 1
and 2, which show sample paths for the average degree of the network un-
der three diﬀerent volatility rates (i.e. diﬀerent payoﬀ-update probabilities),
19ε =0 .01, 0.07, 0.013. Whereas the ﬁrst diagram covers the complete time
horizon of the simulation, i.e. half million periods, the second one provides a
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Figure 1: Average degree, full time horizon.
These diagrams suggest a rather fast convergence of the empirical averages,
a feature that is speciﬁcally conﬁrmed by Figure 3. Indeed, given the estab-
lished ergodicity of the process, we know that the empirical averages observed
along any simulation run must converge, a.s., to the corresponding magnitudes
induced by the unique invariant distribution of the process. The fact that this
convergence is quite fast and independent of initial conditions is further con-
ﬁrmed in Figure 4. In this latter ﬁgure, it is shown how, for each of the three
volatility rates considered, the empirical averages converge quite rapidly to a
common value, even if the alternative paths starting from polar initial condi-
tions. More speciﬁcally, one of these initial conditions correspond to the empty
network, as considered before. On the other hand, the polar case is given by
paths that start at conﬁgurations where all players are connected to their neigh-
bors through their maximum number of two active links.10
Analogous diagrams are displayed in Figures 5, 6, and 7 for the other three
variables of interest: neighbor distance, largest-component share, and average
10To be concrete, what is done in this case in order to construct the initial conditions is to
have every player i support random-payoﬀ links to players i+1and i+2, where these indices
are conceived “modulo n”.
20 21
Figure 2: Average degree, short time horizon 
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uprob = 0.13payoﬀ. In every case we continue to observe that, for all three volatility rates
considered, the empirical magnitudes converge rapidly to a common value even
when staring from polar initial conditions. This shows again that the numerical
simulations are an eﬀective way for approximating the long-run values induced
by the unique invariant distribution of the process.
The procedure outlined has been used to ﬁnd approximate values for the
long-run magnitudes of the variables of interest under a wide range of volatility
rates ε. Our main interest in this respect is to understand the eﬀect of ε on
those long-run values. This is depicted in Figures 8-13 for each of the four
cases: degree, neighbor distance, largest-component share, and link payoﬀs.
Next, I discuss in turn the main ﬁndings obtained for each of them.
First, Figure 8 shows that payoﬀ volatility has a negative eﬀect on network
connectivity. As the update probability ε rises, the density of the social net-
work, as measured by the average node degree, is seen to fall quite signiﬁcantly.
Intuitively, this is a consequence of the fact that, as volatility grows, the pair-
wise stability of former links tends to deteriorate. This phenomenon may be
regarded as a sort of depreciation in formerly accumulated social capital; or, in
other words, as a reﬂection of the negative drift imposed on the value of exist-
ing links by the process of payoﬀ update. For future reference (cf. Subsection
4.2.2), it is worth noting at this point that the decreasing function describing
this eﬀect is convex, the fall being quite steep for low values of ε but ﬂattening
signiﬁcantly at higher values.
Figure 9 depicts what is possibly one of the most remarkable regularities
found in the analysis. It pertains to the fact that, as ε grows, the social network
endogenously adapts to this turn of events by becoming more cohesive.T h i si s
in line with what has been learned (say, in Proposition 3 concerning the PSN
notion) about the role played by network eﬀects in enhancing the incentives for
cooperation. It is interesting to ﬁnd that the network dynamics is responsive to
these considerations, adapting endogenously to take advantage of them. As a
graphic illustration of this phenomenon, Figures 10 and 11 display the networks
prevailing at the end of the time horizon for two very diﬀerent scenarios: one
where payoﬀ volatility is low (ε =0 .02) and another where it is relatively high
(ε =0 .12). In line with our previous discussion, it is observed that in the ﬁrst
case there are a signiﬁcant number of nodes that are loose ends of network paths
— a sign of relatively low cohesiveness — while no such state of aﬀairs is found in
the second case (where, moreover, neighbors are connected on average by shorter
paths).11 Finally, it should be emphasized that the eﬀects at work in this respect
are strong enough to oﬀset the important opposite forces which decrease general
connectivity as ε grows (cf. Figure 13). For, ceteris paribus, such a decrease in
node connectivity induces a marked tendency for any measure of graph-theoretic
distance (even neighbor distance) to rise. A clearer understanding of this point
will be gained in Subsection 4.2.2, where we consider a context with no network
eﬀects (and therefore no strategic beneﬁtf o rc o h e s i v e n e s s ) .
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Figure 9: Payoﬀ volatility and long-run average neighbor distance
25Figure 10: Social network after 5 · 105 periods, ε =0 .02. Any directed arrow
joining two nodes represents a link, with its origin being the agent who supports
that link. Nodes which have no incoming or outgoing link are fully disconnected.
Figure 11: Social network after 5 · 105 periods, ε =0 .12. The same graphical
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Figure 13: Payoﬀ volatility and long-run average payoﬀ
27Figure 12 depicts the eﬀect of payoﬀ volatility on the size of the largest two
components. The ﬁrst interesting observation is that, independently of ε, most
of the connected players belong to a single major component, the second-largest
component remaining very small throughout. This conclusion is somewhat rem-
iniscent of the well known results of Theory of Random Graphs which assert
that, beyond a certain “connectivity threshold”, there arises a single large com-
ponent in the graph. (These mathematical results, however, do not seem readily
applicable here since, in our case, the formation of the social network is very
much the result of a non-random mechanism.) On the other hand, concerning
the eﬀect of ε on the relative size of the largest component, en expected negative
dependence is observed, largely a reﬂection of the analogous behavior displayed
by the long-run average degree.
Finally, we turn to Figure 13, which centers on the eﬀect of payoﬀ volatility
on the average payoﬀ earned per interaction (or link). The evidence gathered
now serves as an interesting complement to that displayed in Figure 8. It shows
that, as ε grows, the fall in the average payoﬀ earned per link reinforces the
negative consequence induced by the formerly discussed decrease in the number
of links (or games played). This latter eﬀect was explained as an embodiment
of social-capital depreciation. In contrast, the present one (a decrease in the
payoﬀ per link) should be largely understood as a consequence of the negative
eﬀects on search imposed by low connectivity and a small network component.
The latter has detrimental implications for the bulk of players’ search activities
(which are component-bound), in turn deteriorating the outcome of this search
(the payoﬀs attained), even when such search is successful (i.e. happens to ﬁnd
a supportable link).
To sum up, the numerical analysis contributes the following insights on the
factors that underlie a robust process of social-capital accumulation. First and
foremost, we ﬁnd that some environmental stability is required, and indeed the
underlying network dynamics always tries to respond to this feature by adapting
endogenously to the extent of prevailing volatility — in particular, by modulating
its cohesiveness accordingly. When the process is successful, the increasing span
of the social network is also exploited in order to enhance the scope of search.
This allows players to maintain high levels of overall payoﬀ performance and
provides them with some important adaptability. Indeed, it is precisely this
adaptability that, in a changing environment, is crucial to sustaining a stable
density of interaction.
Overall, therefore, we ﬁnd that positive feedback eﬀects play a key role in
the process (i.e. the network buildup reinforces itself) since a denser network
both impairs strategic opportunism and enhances search. A useful course to
take for improving our understanding of such positive feedback is to study how
the dynamics would fare if it were either partially absent or somehow weaker.
This is the objective of the following three subsections. The ﬁrst one focuses
on a context where no network eﬀects are assumed to play any role in strate-
gic considerations and therefore players’ cooperation has to be supported just
ε = 002) is 3.6 whereas that of the second (for ε =0 .12) is 2.7.
28bilaterally. Then, the subsequent subsection explores whether a deterioration
of players’ payoﬀs (speciﬁcally, a downward shift in the payoﬀ support) has a
profound and lasting eﬀect on the build up of social capital. Finally, the third
subsection studies the long-run eﬀects of restricting component-bound search to
lie within a relatively short radius of the agent enjoying a revision opportunity.
4.2.2 Network-free strategic behavior
Suppose that, as described in Remark 4, players’ strategic behavior no longer is
inﬂuenced by network (i.e. inter-neighbor) eﬀects. This may be understood as
reﬂecting a diﬀe r e n tn o r mo rc o n v e n t i o nu s e di nt h es o c i e t y—o n ew h e r ep l a y e r s
react to each of their partners only according to the information gathered on
their corresponding bilateral play. Then, strategically speaking, every pairwise
interaction is to be regarded as strategically independent of any other. The
role of the network consequently reduces to deﬁning the channels through which
information diﬀuses in the population, a nevertheless important role that should
still yield interesting dynamic implications. As advanced, contrasting these
implications with those obtained in our benchmark scenario, we hope to gain
further insights on the workings of the model.
Figures 14-17 summarize the long-run eﬀect of payoﬀ volatility on each of
the four variables that guide our analysis: degree, neighbor distance, largest-
component share, and link payoﬀs. (The parameter values are all identical
to those considered in the benchmark scenario.)12 Comparing the long-run
behavior displayed with its counterpart for the basic model (cf. Figures 8-13),
the main points of contrast can be summarized as follows:
1. The bite on social performance caused by increased volatility manifests
itself at much lower rates than in the original scenario. Speciﬁcally, both
the average degree and the network span (cf. Figures 14 and 16) start
to face signiﬁcant downward adjustments at starting values of ε that are
one order of magnitude smaller than before. A similar pattern is dis-
played in Figure 17 for the average payoﬀ per link. In this case, however,
the downward movement is more limited than in the benchmark scenario




3. Of course, such a more limited range of variation on the
materialized payoﬀs is achieved at the expense of a much more pronounced
reduction on the number of links as ε rises.
2. An additional, and very interesting, diﬀerence with the original framework
concerns the abruptness now observed in the transition from a high- to a
low-performance regime. In the absence of network strategic eﬀects, this
transition takes place rather sharply, at least in two complementary senses.
On the one hand, the full change is essentially completed within a range
12By relying on ideas analogous to those used in the proof of Proposition 6, it is immediate
to show that the stochastic process induced in the present case is ergodic and thus long-run
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Figure 17: No network eﬀects: payoﬀ volatility and long-run average payoﬀ
31for ε that, again, is shorter than in the original framework by an order
of magnitude. On the other hand, the “shape” of the curve tracing this
change is roughly concave (i.e. with increasing diﬀerences), in contrast to
the convex shape displayed by the original setup where further increases
in ε led to progressively less signiﬁcant changes in long-run magnitudes.
3. The behavior of average neighbor distance in this case also displays a
marked contrast with the evidence obtained when players could rely on
network strategic eﬀects. Then, we emphasized that an increase in ε leads
to rising network cohesiveness (i.e. decreasing neighbor distance), as the
endogenous way in which the population ends up partially oﬀsetting the
increased volatility. Now, however, since cohesiveness brings about no
relevant payoﬀ consequences, an increase in ε induces a corresponding
increase in neighbor distance. In essence, this transition is a mirror image
of the parallel change experienced by the connectivity of the network,
which naturally has the eﬀect of increasing all network distances. (Recall
the point made in this connection when discussing Figure 9.)
4.2.3 A less rewarding environment
Now, we focus on the eﬀect of alternative payoﬀ conditions on the behavior
of the model. As it turns out, there are little surprises in this respect, and
the essential points can be gleaned from just considering a scenario where the
original payoﬀ conditions are subject to a simple, say downward, shift in the
payoﬀ support. Speciﬁcally, it is supposed that this support continues to have a
unit width but its upper end ζ (and consequently it lower end ζ) are decreased by
am e r e0.05, i.e. [ζ,ζ]=[ 0 .35,1.35]. This is still consistent with the hypotheses
of Proposition 6 (thus ergodicity is guaranteed), but the ex-ante probability that
a fresh draw exceeds the threshold
ν(1−δ)
δ = 4
3 for bilateral-based cooperation
now reduces to 1
60.
Under these conditions, the eﬀect of payoﬀ volatility on long-run behav-
ior is described in Figures 18-21. Comparing each of these ﬁgures with their
counterparts obtained under the original payoﬀ conditions, one ﬁnds the same
qualitative behavior in terms of how the long-run values of each of the four vari-
ables of interest depend on the volatility rate. In the present case, however, the
curves that reﬂect such dependence are seen to experience a global downward
shift of signiﬁcant magnitude across all four cases.
Concerning average degree, network span, or average payoﬀ per link, the
observed downward shift is simply the intuitive reﬂection of the fact that, as the
payoﬀ conditions deteriorate, so must happen as well with the performance of the
social system. In the case of neighbor distance, on the other hand, the downward
adjustment observed for every value of ε is again an interesting indication of
how the network dynamics endogenously responds to the underlying exogenous
circumstances. Here, in particular, it leads to an increase in the cohesiveness
of the social network if, for any given volatility rate, the payoﬀ environment
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Figure 22: Search radius ρ =2 : volatility and long-run average degree
4.2.4 Short-radius search
One of the key features of the model has been to endow the social network with a
crucial role concerning how the information diﬀuses throughout the population.
This approach has been applied both to strategically-relevant information (i.e.
past behavior of neighbors) as well as to fresh payoﬀ opportunities. In the latter
case, which arises when a player is at an “ordinary” (frequent) revision juncture,
we have assumed that search is bound by her current component. In this respect,
the interpretation has been that a revising agent can only be informed of payoﬀ
opportunities that arrive through the network, much as the information she
receives pertaining to neighbors’ previous behavior. But, motivated by the
idea that payoﬀ-related knowledge may be complex and thus dissipate easily in
bilateral communication, it is reasonable to contemplate the possibility that its
“travelling distance” might be severely limited. Formally, this would amount to
postulating that any fruitful search of new payoﬀ opportunities is constrained
by a certain radius, possibly of a short magnitude.
To explore the implications of this possibility, I have considered a variation
of the original model where component-bound search (recall (2.a) in Subsection
2.2) only renders fresh payoﬀ draws that are at a network distance of the revising
agent lower than some pre-speciﬁed search radius ρ. For a starkest contrast,
Figures 22-25 summarize the results for the lowest meaningful value of this
radius, ρ =2 , and the parameter values used in the benchmark scenario.13
Interestingly, no major changes are found at a qualitative level, when the
13It can be readily veriﬁed that the argument used in Proposition 6 to establish ergodicity
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Figure 25: Search radius ρ =2 : volatility and long-run average payoﬀ
present results under a short search radius are compared with those for the
original model, as depicted in Figures 8-13. Focusing on the details, however,
some intuitive diﬀerences do arise, some of which are worth noting. First, as
one would expect, the short search radius translates itself into signiﬁcantly lower
neighbor distances, at all values of ε — i.e. a global downward shift of the cor-
responding curve (cf. Figure 23). Naturally, this larger cohesiveness in turn
induces a larger connectivity (long-run average degree), which is a direct re-
ﬂection of the stronger network eﬀects that now impinge on players’ strategic
considerations (cf. Figure 22). Finally, Figure 24 displays no signiﬁcant eﬀects
on the largest-component shares observed at diﬀerent volatility rates, while Fig-
u r e2 5d o e ss h o ws y s t e m a t i cn e g a t i v ed i ﬀerences with the average payoﬀ earned
per link in the benchmark scenario. The latter contrast represents an interest-
ing complement to that observed with respect to network connectivity. While
connectivity rises with a short search radius because of a stronger link stability
(aﬀorded, as explained above, by an increasing cohesiveness) the average payoﬀ
earned per existing link falls due to the narrower search imposed by that short
radius.
5M e a n - ﬁeld analysis
In this section, our objective is to undertake a so-called mean-ﬁeld analysis of
the model, akin to what is customarily done in statistical physics for large com-
plex systems of interacting entities. In a nutshell, what underlies this approach
is the presumption that, in the presence of a large number of stochastic inter-
37actions, the aggregate (or average) behavior of the system can be reasonably
well understood (or approximated) in expected terms — i.e. through a simpler
deterministic representation of the process that embodies, on the one hand, an
average description of the state of the system and deﬁnes, on the other hand,
its law of motion in expected (or mean-ﬁeld) terms.
As mentioned in the Introduction, such an analysis is carried out in more
detail in the companion paper of Marsili, Slanina and Vega-Redondo (2002).
Here, I simply outline part of it, the focus being to shed some new light on the
conclusions derived from the numerical analysis of the model. More speciﬁcally,
the main objective will be to study the dynamics of the network connectivity
(i.e. the average degree) and its key dependence on the rate of payoﬀ volatility.
Concerning the latter, for example, we hope to gain some insight on why the
eﬀect of payoﬀ volatility is aﬀected, both quantitatively and qualitatively, by
t h ep r e s e n c eo ra b s e n c eo fs t r a t e g i cn e t w o r ke ﬀects. Naturally, much of what
will be done with respect to network connectivity may be suitably extended to
the study of other long-run variables, e.g. network span or average payoﬀs.
First, we ignore the components of the social dynamics that are concerned
with payoﬀ update and link creation through search. We start, therefore, by
considering that part of the dynamics that deals with the gradual removal of
pairwise-unstable links. Given any possible link ij ∈ N × N, let λij(t) ∈ {0,1}
specify whether this link is in place at t (an event which is signiﬁed by λij(t)=1 )
or not (denoted by λij(t)=0 ) . Then, for any such link ij, the dynamics of link-
removal (due to pairwise instability) leads to the following law of motion:
λij(t +1 )=λij(t) ·I[ζij(t +1 )− βij(t +1 ) ] , (8)
where:
• ζij(t+1)is the cooperation payoﬀ prevailing at t+1for the game played
by i and j (it may normalized to zero if there is no link connecting i and
j),
•I [·] is an indicator function deﬁned by I[y]=0if y<0 and I[y]=1if
y ≥ 0, and












and ϕji(t +1 )is deﬁned reciprocally.
In the adjustment rule (8), the term βij(t +1 )quantiﬁes the strength of
the “strategic network eﬀects” bearing on the link ij.T h o s e e ﬀects are to be
compared with ζij(t +1 )— i.e. must exceed this payoﬀ —i no r d e rt oc o n ﬁrm
38the pairwise-stability of the link (and thus its remaining in place). To see this,
simply note that the implied conditions for this state of aﬀairs:
ζij(t +1 ) ≥ ϕij(t +1 )
ζij(t +1 ) ≥ ϕji(t +1 )
are a mere rewriting of the pairwise-stability condition (5), as it pertains the
link ij.
Next, we introduce a second component of the dynamics, namely, random
payoﬀ update. As formulated in Subsection 2.2, this process subjects every ex-
isting link to an independent probability ε of having its payoﬀ updated afresh.
Building upon the formulation used in (8), the expected law of motion that in-
cludes both payoﬀ update and consequent link removal may be concisely written
as follows:
Et[λij(t +1 ) ]=( 1− ε)λij(t)+ελ ij(t)Pr{ζij ≥ βij(t)}, (10)
where the implicit assumption here is that the expectation on βij is “static”,
i.e. Et[βij(t+1)]=βij(t). Therefore, every preceding link which is not subject
t oap a y o ﬀ update remains in place and, for those which do experience such an
update, their probability of staying pairwise-stable is:




where fζ is the (continuous) density that governs every payoﬀ draw.
Now, the key approximation step that is undertaken by the mean-ﬁeld ap-
proach is to rely on the link-speciﬁc law of motion (10) to posit an average










Then, if we suppose that the network eﬀects can be suitable averaged across
players through a common ˆ β(t), the aggregate mean-ﬁeld counterpart of (10)
may be written as follows:





































39which may be rewritten as follows:
Et[κ(t +1 ) ] =
 
1 − ε + ε
 
1 −





=[ 1 − ε
  ˆ β(t)
ζ
fζ(z)d z] κ(t).
Finally, we complete the dynamics by adding the process of search and cre-
ation of new links. In the spirit of our mean-ﬁeld approach, this dynamics of
link creation is captured through a certain function φ(κ) of the current degree
κ ∈ [0,2m], where recall that m is the maximum number of links that any given
individual can support (therefore, 2m is the maximum average degree). For tech-
nical convenience, φ :[ 0 ,2m] → R is assumed twice diﬀerentiable. Conceptually,
this function is to be interpreted as embodying the rate of link creation that
is associated to component-bound search, the “ordinary” (and more frequent)
mechanism for creating new links. We postulate, therefore, that it satisﬁes the
following boundary conditions:
φ(0) = φ(2m)=0 . (11)
On the one hand, the condition that φ(κ) should vanish at κ =0is simply a
reﬂection of the fact that, in an empty network, component-bound search yields
no fresh opportunities. On the other hand, the additional condition that φ(κ)
must vanish at κ =2 m is a mere consequence of the limitation assumed on
the number of active links that any single player can support — when every
player is exhausting all her linking possibilities (thus the average degree is at
its maximum), no further net increase is possible. To simplify the discussion,
we shall also complement (11) with the following two additional conditions:
φ
 (0) = 0 (12)
φ(κ) > 0, ∀κ ∈ (0,2m). (13)
The ﬁrst one is not crucial, but facilitates the discussion by making κ =0ac l e a r -
cut reference point in the analysis.14 The second condition, on the other hand,
merely embodies the natural idea that as long as there is still some capacity for
further connections, search always contributes, in expected terms, some positive
“drift” of link creation.
Combining the three component of the dynamics considered (link removal,
payoﬀ update, and link creation), the mean-ﬁeld law of motion for the network
average degree can be compactly written as follows:
κ(t +1 )=[ 1− ε
  ˆ β(t)
ζ
fζ(z)d z] κ(t)+φ(κ(t)), (14)
14If this condition did not hold, a small value of κ (its magnitude associated to the frequency
rate of search) would fulﬁl lt h es a m er o l ea sz e r oi nt h ee n s u i n ga n a l y s i s .
40where, to in order to obtain a deterministic system, we make the further sim-
pliﬁcation of substituting actual for expected motion in the LHS of the above
expression. This leads to a one-dimensional autonomous system in κ(t), which
is the basis of our ensuing analysis.
A detailed study of the above dynamics requires positing some explicit func-
tional dependence of ˆ β(t) on κ(t). Of course, one obvious possibility in this
respect would be to suppose that ˆ β is constant, i.e. independent of κ. This,
indeed, is what characterizes the scenario where no strategic network eﬀects are
allowed, in which case the mean-ﬁeld law of motion may be written as follows:





fζ(z)d z] κ(t)+φ(κ(t)). (15)
The above simple formulation is a direct consequence of the fact that, under
no strategic network eﬀects, a link can support cooperation if, an only if, it
exceeds the threshold ν
(1−δ)
δ . But, in the strategic scenario of interest (i.e. that
of the original model), the key feature is that ˆ β and κ are functionally related,
a consideration that cannot be possibly ignored if the mean-ﬁe l da p p r o a c hi st o
respect the essential modelling aspects of original framework.
Recall that, for each ij, βij(t +1 )=m a x {ϕij(t +1 ) ,ϕji(t +1 ) }. Therefore,






for some A ≥ 1,w h e r e ·  stands for suitably computed averages. Then, in view











































and  ζuv(t) uv∈g(t) by constant (i.e. time-invariant values), say ˆ δ and ˆ ζ respec-
tively, we may write the above expression as follows:
ˆ β(t)=A
 
U − ˆ δ
 





where the notational shorthand U ≡ 1−δ
δ ν is used.
For concreteness, let us adhere to the payoﬀ conditions prevailing in the sim-
ulations and suppose that the cooperation payoﬀs ζij are distributed uniformly
on the support [ζ,ζ] satisfying ζ − ζ =1 . Then, introducing (16) in (14), we
arrive at the following expression:
κ(t +1 )=
 




U − ˆ δ
 








41which is, under the contemplated assumptions, the mean-ﬁeld approximation of
the network-degree dynamics corresponding to the original model. As advanced,
we are interested in comparing its induced dynamics will that resulting from a
a context where no strategic network eﬀects are allowed. For this latter case,
the suitable mean-ﬁeld formulation is:
κ(t +1 )=[ 1− ε(U − ζ)] κ(t)+φ(κ(t)), (18)
which is obtained from (15) by introducing the aforementioned uniformity as-
sumption on the density fζ.
To start our discussion, an immediate conclusion that follows from mere
inspection of (17) is that, at least for low values of κ, higher values of ε bring
about a corresponding decrease network connectivity. That is, the higher is the
volatility rate, the lower is (ceteris paribus,i ft h ec u r r e n tl e v e li sn o tt o oh i g h )
the average degree prevailing in the next period. This represents a clear-cut
manifestation of the detrimental eﬀect of payoﬀ volatility that, throughout our
discussion, has played a central role in the motivation and analysis of the model.
Naturally, one expects that such negative bearing of volatility on the accu-
mulation of social capital should have a more powerful eﬀect at low levels of
average connectivity, when network eﬀects can play less of an oﬀsetting role.
This, indeed, is highlighted by the dynamics given by (17), where the point
κ =0always turns out to be a locally stable equilibrium. (Here, of course, we
make the assumption that U ≡ 1−δ
δ ν > ζ and use that φ(0) = 0.) Worded some-
what diﬀerently, this latter conclusion can be understood as suggesting that a
discrete “upward shift” is always required if an empty conﬁguration is to evolve
i n t oas o c i a ln e t w o r kw i t ha n ypositive connectivity. In the context aﬀorded by
our mean-ﬁeld approximation, such an upward shift is to be conceived as the
outcome of occasional “global” search, a component of the dynamics that, as
explained, is kept only in the background.
Polar to the previous considerations, one would also expect that network con-
ﬁgurations that display high levels of κ should prove quite resilient to volatility.
And again, the mean-ﬁeld dynamics (17) support this conjecture and also prove
quite useful in understanding its underpinning. First, note that if κ may reach
an arbitrarily large level (i.e. if m is suﬃciently large), then the point κ =2 m
corresponding to maximally connected network is sure to be locally stable in
terms of the mean-ﬁeld dynamics. Speciﬁcally, the condition for this state of
aﬀairs to materialize is simply that
A
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− ζ < 0,











, an average “eﬀective discount
rate” reﬂecting both the underlying discount rate δ and the time steps required
42for information to move across two typical neighbors. Condition (19) does not
appear to be be demanding. For example, in our benchmark simulations , if we
were approximate ˆ δ by the number that results from raising the discount rate δ
(= 3/4) to the long-run average neighbor distance (which is never higher than
4, even for very low values of ε),al o w e rb o u n df o ri tw o u l db e0.3. This rather
loose lower bound, in turn, is greater that 1
2m = 1
4, which suggests that the
conditions displayed by the benchmark scenario are consistent with condition
(19).
Thus assume that this condition holds. Then, the dynamics (17) has the
two extreme points, κ =0 ,2m,e a c hd e ﬁning locally stable (i.e. “dynamically
robust) conﬁgurations. Under what conditions are these points the only robust
equilibria? To answer this question, rewrite (17) as follows:
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κ. When this latter function is strictly
negative (and therefore the positive truncation does not apply), it is strictly
convex. Thus, if the other function in the RHS of (20), φ(κ), does not display
an “excessive opposite curvature” which may oﬀs e tt h a tc o n v e x i t yf o rl o wκ
(see Proposition 9 for a suitable bound), at most one interior equilibrium of
e x i s t sa n dt h eq u e s t i o np o s e da b o v ec a nb ea n s w e r e di nt h ea ﬃrmative. That
is, the two end points of the state space are the sole robust (asymptotically
stable) states in this case. Furthermore, it then follows that the state space can
be essentially partitioned into two disjoint basins of attraction, K0 and K2m,
which are separated by an interior threshold ˜ κ. When the process starts below
this threshold (i.e. κ(0) ∈ K0), it converges to the lower end of the state space
given by κ =0 . Instead, when the initial condition κ(0) lies above the threshold
(i.e. belongs to K2m), the induced path converges to the upper end κ =2 m.
To sum up the former discussion, it is useful to gather formally its main
points in the following result, whose complete proof is omitted for the sake of
brevity.
Proposition 9 Consider the discrete-time dynamics (17) deﬁned on [0,2m]
with U>ζ and ˆ δ > 1
2m. Further assume that φ(.) satisﬁes (11)-(13) and
φ
  (κ) > −εˆ δ
 
ˆ ζ + U
 
for all κ ≤ U
ˆ δ(ˆ ζ+U).15 Then, there is a certain thresh-
old value ˜ κ ∈ (0,2m) such that:16
(a) if the initial point κ(0) < ˜ κ,t h e nlimt→∞ κ(t)=0 ;





16Note, of course, that (a) and (b) make, respectively, the points κ =0and κ =2 m be
locally (i.e. asymptotically) stable.
43(b) if the initial point κ(0) > ˜ κ,t h e nlimt→∞ κ(t)=2 m.
The above result provide an approximate analysis of the network dynam-
ics (in particular, its degree) through the expected law of motion of a typical
node/player embodying average considerations. The main implications of this
analysis is that there are just two polar conﬁgurations which are possible attrac-
tors of the model’s “representative behavior”. On the one hand, if the starting
connectivity conditions are dense enough, the adjustment dynamics leads to a
situation of maximum connectivity. Instead, if the initial average density does
not reach the required threshold, the mean-ﬁe l dd y n a m i c sl e a d st o w a r d st h e
eventual vanishing of all links.
Of course, the “representative-node” ﬁction that is used to motivate the
mean-ﬁeld barouche is a heroic construct, while the average considerations that
are supposed to guide its behavior can only represent a compact way of identify-
ing the essential dynamic forces governing a very complex system. The insights
thus obtained, however, may be viewed as an expression of the tendencies that
govern the dynamics of the diﬀerent network components. (Recall that the pos-
tulated mean-ﬁeld dynamics only embodies component-based forces.) And, in
this vein, a ﬁrst insight that arises is that, as a general tendency, one should
expect to ﬁnd the network divided into two kinds of components: those where
the average connectivity reaches it maximum level and others displaying no
links whatsoever (i.e. singleton components). In a sense, therefore, the pre-
diction is that the positive feedback eﬀects that underlie the network dynamics
should either bring about the full connecting potential or, instead, must prove
completely unable to trigger a successful buildup. Indeed, this is the behavior
observed in the simulations, as illustrated, for example, in Figures 10 and 11, or
suggested by a comparison of the ﬁgures which depict the average degree and
largest-component share (e.g. Figures 8 and 12).17
But then, building upon this line of thought, a complementary prediction is
that the relative sizes of the basins of attraction for the two polar conﬁgurations
(κ =0 ,2m) should be in line with the relative fraction of nodes observed in
each of the two types of components — i.e. maximally connected or empty ones.
This in turn suggests studying how the threshold ˜ κ which marks those relative
sizes depends on the volatility rate ε, a dependence that should help clarify the
contrast between the diﬀerent qualitative behavior observed in the presence or
absence of strategic network eﬀects. In this respect, it is straightforward to rely
on the analysis that led to Proposition 9 to arrive at the following result.
Proposition 10 Consider the discrete-time dynamics (17) under the same as-
sumptions as in Proposition 9 and denote by ˜ κ(ε) the threshold established in
it, as a function of the underlying value of ε. Then, for any ε  > ε (keeping the
rest of the parameters ﬁxed), ˜ κ(ε ) changes continuously with ε  in an increasing
fashion.
17For example, if one computes the ratio between the average degree and the fraction of
nodes involved in non-singleton components, the result is always barely below 4 (which is
equal to the maximum average degree in this case, where m =2 ).
44The previous result provides a formal basis to understand the negative de-
pendence of the network connectivity on the underlying rate of payoﬀ update.
This dependence, in turn, is what explains the negative eﬀect of payoﬀ volatil-
ity on other measures of performance such as, for example, the average payoﬀ
earned across existing links. An important feature of this relationship between
the volatility rate and average degree is that it is gradual — or, expressed in
mathematical terms, continuous. This contrasts with the behavior observed in
the alternative scenario where players’ strategic interaction relied on no net-
work eﬀects. In this case, the dependence on ε was still negative and gradual
within a certain low range but, at a certain point, an abrupt change in long-run
performance occurred associated to a small change in this parameter. Thus, in
comparison with the situation observed for the benchmark scenario, this latter
evidence could be understood as the indication of a discontinuous regime change
caused by a slight change in ε.18
To shed light on this contrast, let us return to the mean-ﬁeld description of
the scenario with no strategic network eﬀects (cf. (18)), which is convenient to
rewrite as follows:
κ(t +1 )− κ(t)=φ(κ(t)) − ε(U − ζ) κ(t). (21)
To draw a clearer comparison with the benchmark scenario, it is useful to
introduce some new notation. Given any volatility rate ε > 0, denote by Ω(ε)
the limit points which have a basin of attraction of positive measure in the
benchmark scenario, and let ˇ Ω(ε) be its counterpart for the scenario with no
strategic network eﬀects. From Proposition 9, we know that,under the main-
tained assumptions, we have:
Ω(ε)={0,2m}
for all ε > 0.
Turning now to the alternative dynamics given by (21), it is clear (again
under the assumptions of Proposition 9) that, if ε is low enough albeit positive,
ˇ Ω(ε) includes not only κ =0but also some other positive values of κ. Denote
by
ˇ κ(ε) ≡ max {κ : κ ∈ ˇ Ω(ε)}
the largest limit point for any given ε > 0. Then, for low ε, is close to 2m
and changes continuously with ε. Now let ε∗ be the maximum value of ε for
which ˇ κ(ε) > 0. Precisely, ε∗ i st h es l o p eo ft h es m a l l e s tm i n i m u mc o n er o o t e d
at the origin which encompasses the region in R2
+ under the function φ. Under
our maintained assumptions, it is straightforward to see that ε∗ < 1. And,
by construction, it follows that, for all ε > ε∗, ˇ κ(ε)=0(or, equivalently,
ˇ Ω(ε)={0}), which implies a discontinuous change in the limit behavior of
the dynamics (21). This discontinuity in the limit behavior of the mean-ﬁeld
18In statistical physicis, this behavior is often encountered and usually referred to as a
“phase transition.”
45dynamics should in turn be mirrored by a corresponding abrupt change in the
long-run behavior of the stochastic dynamics of the full-scale system.
We ﬁnd, therefore, that the qualitative contrast found in the simulations
between the ε-dependence displayed by the social dynamics with, or without,
strategic network eﬀects is reconﬁrmed by our present analytical approach. In
essence, what we obtain is theoretical support for the intuitive idea that network
eﬀects may be an eﬀective way for a society to respond eﬀectively to a volatile
environment.
6 Related literature
In this section, I schematically review the relationship of the present paper to
a variety of diﬀerent literatures.
The approach pursued here is similar in spirit to that of the evolutionary
literature, where players are assumed to interact through a certain game and the
long-run conﬁguration is obtained through a gradual stochastic process of learn-
ing and adjustment. The seminal papers in this line of research are Kandori,
Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young (1993). In these papers, the interaction is
global — all agents play with every other player in the population, or at least
have the same probability of doing so. This feature was altered in Ellison (1983),
where each agent’s interaction is local, play restricted to immediate neighbors
on a ﬁxed regular network (or grid). More recent work by Droste et al. (1999),
Goyal and Vega-Redondo (1999), or Jackson and Watts (1999) have extended
the analysis to a context where the network is not ﬁxed but co-evolves with
players’ game decisions. This latter work is, therefore, the closest in motivation
to the present endeavour.
The aforementioned evolutionary literature has typically considered contexts
where the game played by the population is a simple bilateral game in strate-
gic form — often a coordination game. Players are required to play the same
action in each interaction, since otherwise the network would have no inﬂuence
on strategic behavior. This contrasts with our present framework where the
decisions are adopted independently for each of the games being played and the
network inﬂuence on players’ behavior is only indirect through the way in which
strategically-relevant information diﬀuses through the population.
There is, moreover, the booming body of literature whose speciﬁc concern
is the study of pure models of network formation, in contexts where players
do not have a separate strategic decision in terms of constituent game. One
of the earliest papers in this ﬁeld was Aumann and Myerson (1989), with the
more recent paper by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) having played an important
role in reviving interest in this topic. Whereas the approach of these papers is
mostly static,19 Bala and Goyal (2000) represents an explicit dynamic approach
to the problem, and is thus more in line with the present eﬀorts.
19For example, Jackson and Wolinsky rely on a notion of pairwise-stability that bears a
close relationship to that introduced in Deﬁnition1 .
46In the vast area of repeated games, there are two papers, Kandori (1992)
and Ellison (1994), which share some motivation with our approach. They pro-
pose a model where a large population of players are repeatedly and randomly
matched to play a Prisioner Dilemma game. They ﬁnd that, in this context, it
may be still possible to induce cooperation through a social norm (equilibrium)
that reacts to any deviation by punishing subsequent partners. In a sense, the
relationship of these papers to our work is parallel to that displayed by the early
evolutionary literature with ﬁxed and global interaction structure: they embed
players’ interaction in a population context but abstract from the eﬀect of social
structure by postulating a ﬁxed and global pattern of play.
Still in the area of repeated games, two additional related papers are Haag
and Lagunoﬀ (2000) and the already mentioned by Bernheim and Whinston
(1990). The latter studies a model of multimarket collusion where a group of
ﬁrms participating in some common set of markets may decide to link their
behavior in any one of them to what has been observed in other markets. Natu-
rally, this enhances the collusion (i.e. cooperation) potential, in ways analogous
to those considered here. The key diﬀerence is that the ﬂow of information is
instantaneous and therefore there is no interesting notion of social network that
may have a bearing on the situation. Instead, the paper by Haag and Lagunoﬀ
does study a setup where players are involved in repeated interaction with part-
ners speciﬁed by some given social network. Its approach, however, is mostly
normative and static, with an additional important diﬀerence being that players
are forced to play the same action — cooperate or defect — with everyone of their
neighbors. Therefore, the strategic implications of the (exogenously speciﬁed)
network are directly given by the formulation of the population game (which re-
quires a common action in all encounters) rather than being of an informational
nature on a set of “decoupled” bilateral interactions. In a this light, our ap-
proach may be viewed as embedding the Kandori’s and Ellison’s aforementioned
approach with independent bilateral interaction into a endogenously changing
social network.
The study of social networks has hardly been a preserve of economists or
game theorists. Rather, it has long been a primary object of study by sociologists
or applied psychologists. Besides the research it has spawned in connection to
the notion of social capital (which is discussed later), prominent sociologists such
as Mark Granovetter (1973) or Ronald Burt (1982) have placed it at the center
of sociological inquiry. For example, the notions of “weak ties” highlighted by
Granovetter, or “structural holes” due Burt have given rise to a large body
of theoretical and empirical work in sociology, which still continues to thrive.
Other early and well-known research was carried out by Milgram (1967), an
applied psychologist, who demonstrated through clever simple experiments the
surprising low number of steps which tend to separate any two arbitrarily chosen
individuals in many large social networks. Since then, most such networks are
known to be of a so-called “small world” kind, a phenomenon that has recently
attract much attention by physicits and other researchers interested in the study
of complex systems. A strong stimulus to this literature was provided by Watts
and Strogatz (1998), which triggered a booming and wide-ranging collection of
47multidisciplinary work, in which still physicists such as Albert-Lazslo Barabasi
(see Barabasi and Albert (1999)) or Mark Newman (see Newman et al. (2000))
play a leading role.
Finally, we close this brief review by referring to the literature and ideas that
were amply invoked in the Introduction to motivate our model, namely, those
connected to the notion of social capital. Rather than attempting a necessarily
superﬁcial survey of the vast and diverse rane of research that goes under this
heading, it should be more useful to focus on the work of James Coleman,
arguably the “father" of this concept. He is also the author who appears to
have conceived social capital more in line with the view espoused here — see
Coleman (1988) or (1990, Ch. 12). For him, social capital is an inherently
relational concept, best regarded as an attribute of the social network. It is the
key factor explaining the intensity and stability of socio-economic interaction
and also represents the basis of trust in repeated interaction (in particular,
Coleman often uses the PD as the paradigmatic example). However, for such
a trust to emerge, what he calls the closure of the social network (what we
have called its cohesiveness) is generally key. He argues, moreover, that social
capital is often underprovided, since the strong externalities associated to it are
typically not internalized by individuals’ own link-investment decisions. Finally,
he stresses that social capital is a stock which, left to itself, depreciates with
time and that, if it is to be (re)built succesfully, must have inter-agent relations
enjoy a suﬃciently stable environment. The reader will recognize in these points
many of the features (both modelling and motivational) that have informed our
eﬀorts in this paper.
7 Summary and possible extensions
This paper has studied a stylized model of network formation in which play-
ers are involved in an inﬁnitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with each of her
neighbors. Information on past behavior ﬂows gradually along the network, a
feature that impinges crucially on the range of network conﬁgurations that can
be supported in a pairwise stable fashion. The underlying payoﬀ conditions
change over time, which in turn may aﬀect the stability of established links
and create the opportunity to form new ones. Our analysis has focused on the
interplay between the emerging characteristics of the endogenous network, the
long-run performance of the system, and the key parameters of the model — most
importantly, the volatility rate at which the payoﬀs of current links is updated.
The main insights obtained can be summarized as follows. Payoﬀ volatility
cannot be too intense if a successfully build of the network is to be sustained
in the long run. As the environmental conditions worsen (e.g. payoﬀs becomes
more volatile or less rewarding), the network endogenously evolves in order
to oﬀset this turn of events by becoming more cohesive. At a certain point,
however, even this mechanism proves unable to maintain other than a quite
sparse network. This transition, which takes place both if players can rely on
strategic network eﬀects or not in supporting cooperation, appears much earlier
48and is more abrupt in the latter case than in the former. These conclusions
have been obtained through a “numerical computation” of the ergodic variables
of the process, but further insight has been gained on them by a mean-ﬁeld
approximation of the basic model.
The model is to be conceived as a ﬁrst step along an as-yet little trodden
path. Thus let me ﬁnish with some suggestions as to some extensions and issues
that are left for future research.
A natural extension would involve enriching the set of games under consider-
ation, possibly to other sorts of simple bilateral games (e.g. coordination games)
or playing the ﬁeld contexts. Along these lines, one further possibility would be
to suppose that, as found in the literature (see above), players are forced to take
the same action in all games. The interplay between the network considerations
brought about by this modiﬁcation and the informational aspects considered
here may yield novel insights.
Concerning payoﬀ volatility, it would be interesting to allow for the (arguably
realistic) possibility that the realizations induced by any fresh payoﬀ update
may be correlated in some dimension. For example, the payoﬀs pertaining
a particular individual might display positive correlation (the reﬂection of a
generally creative or well positioned player at some point in time) or, in a
somewhat similar vein, new payoﬀ draws could include an aggregate component.
Any of these modiﬁcations is bound to yield important implications on the
network dynamics and its long-run architecture.
Payoﬀs, on the other hand, might be subject to some exogenous or endoge-
nous trend. Concerning the ﬁrst possibility, it would be interesting to postulate
that existing payoﬀsa r ea ﬀected by some negative drift, a phenomenon that
could reﬂect an outside forward-moving environment that sets the benchmark
for the payoﬀs obtained. As for a trend of an endogenous kind, it would be in-
teresting to suppose that the payoﬀs earned are to be normalized by population-
average payoﬀs or that, new payoﬀs are drawn according to a moving distribu-
tion anchored to average or frontier conditions. In either case, a supplementary
competitive pressure would be added to the model that may well introduce
new considerations, as well as endow the model with a genuinely dynamic (or
growth) perspective.
To conclude, a ﬁnal suggestion concerns the possibility of removing the ﬁxed
upper bound on the number of links that an agent can support but instead
contemplate a cost to be incurred by the players involved (perhaps equally
shared, or possibly with a larger cost share paid by the initiating party). This
would make the number of links that is eﬀectively supported an endogenous
variable, an would quite naturally link the density of the network to prevailing
payoﬀ conditions.
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